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Introduction

The growth of the Iuternet pushed by the development of user-friendly browsers has
turned into reality the notion of electronic commerce and business on the Internet.
The decrease in hardware costs and storage prices in the last few years has increased
the accessibility of personal computers to the ordinary person on the street. Currently

Network Computers (NC) are being flagg~d as the next possible source for large
consumption of PC-related technologies, bringing not only electronic commerce, but
a whole range of computerized activities and entertainment, into the home living
room. A whole range of new services will he provided via the Internet, connecting
consumers and suppliers evermore closely in the global economy.

One such service will be that of electronic strongboxes [1] as part of the larger electronic commerce infrastructure. We view the provision of electronic strongboxes as a
natural progression from that of electronic trading in general. As the security of the
Internet is further developed and standards for electronic commerce become stable
and are reflected in secure implementation, we perceive that electronic strongboxes
will become "just another service" deliverer! through and by the Internet.
The concept of electronic strongboxes has ]wen derived from the similar notion found
in the physical world. In the traditional financial sector the provision of strongboxes
has been in service for sometime. Customers can apply to have a private strongbox
held within a bank, in which the customer can place any type and any amount of
valuables, subject only to the physical characteristics of the strongbox. The bank
typically has no interest in the contents of the strongbox, and derives income from
providing safe storage and access to such strongboxes. The identity of the strongbox
customer and the fact itself of the customer having a strongbox are usually treated
as confidential by the bank.
The technology to implement secure electronic strongboxes is party available today.
A large part of the protocols that can be employed can be derived from other systems
in electronic commerce, which so far has focused mainly on payment systems. These
proposed systems range from those which require an interface to the existing financial
infrastructure (such as DigiCash [2, 3], iKP [4], NetBill [5] and SET [6]), to those
which employ electronic coins/cash as a reusable payment mechanism circulating
electronically (eg. NetCash/NetCheque [7, 8]).
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Electronic Strongboxes: Background

Physical strongboxes have been employed ill the financial and other sectors for sometime now. Banks often provide strongboxes for their customers, charging a certain fee
for the safekeeping of the strongboxes. Typically, some form of identification - direct
or indirect - is required before the bank allows the customer access to the box itself.
The identification can be an actual identifying personal information (eg. driver's license), or it can be in the form of a token (eg. card or access-key) recognizable by
the bank. The advantage of a token lies in the anonymity of the customer, which is
a primary requirement for physical strongbox and electronic strongbox systems.
2

The requirement of anonymity is tied closely to that of privacy, and is accepted as part
of the service provided by the bank or other strongbox providers. In the electronic
realm, anonymity has been a major issue within electronic commerce dealing with
monetary transactions. Like ordinary cash, electronic money should provide the basic
features of the untraceability of payments, undeniability of payments (and receipts),
and others.
In the electronic strongbox concept, the anonymity of customers goes hand-in-hand
with the need of secrecy with regards to the "electronic items" being stored in the
strongbox. Like the bank, the electronic strongbox provider should not be interested
in the contents of the strongboxes, but should derive income from providing a userfriendly and secure strongbox service. \Vit.h the advent of browsers for the worldwide-web, and the resulting interest in eledronic commerce, user-friendly interfaces
can be created using existing secure browsers that have been implemented to handle
electronic commerce and trading.
Users of a strongbox-browser should be allowed to manipulate objects stored within
the strongbox using an iconic object represelltation. These electronic objects or items
can be certified representations of physical objects, and can include electronic coins or
cash, electronic bank cheques, digital doculllents (eg. stocks and contracts), anonymous digital certificates of ownership of physical items, cryptographic material to
access other services, and others. A custolller may have multiple strongboxes, each
at differing strongbox providers. Using a unified interface, customers should be able
to move items between strongboxes, each ullder different providers.
A third party maybe appointed for such cases when disputes occur between an owner
of a strongbox and the institution that maintains the strongbox. This may occur,
for example, when a dishonest user claims tllat his or her access key has a matching
strongbox within the bank, or when the ballk inappropriately denies access to a valid
owner of strongbox.
The provision of strongboxes on a global network such as the Internet should lead to
an economy which is based not only on monetary transactions, but also on bader,
or personal trade. As the exchange of items is a normal part of daily life, electronic
strongboxes can be a medium within which to carry-out non-monetary commerce with
privacy, confidentiality and user anonymity. Other institutions may act as valuers and
conve1'ters where valuable items (eg. gold) are given a valuation and an electronic
certificate for the item is provided. The sallie institution may also provide long-term
safe storage for the physical items, whilst t.he anonymous owner uses the electronic
certificate on the Internet. Such certificates should never be convertible to electronic
coins or cash for payments, as they may present an opportunity for money laundering
or similar activities that may have drastic iIllplications on the Internet-based economy.
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Another way of approaching the electronic strongbox concept is that of seeing the
strongboxes as a kind of secure public storage medium. Items belonging to a user
can be dispersed throughout the Internet ill a transparent manner. Users should not
be concerned with the underlying management of the strongboxes. However, they
should receive a high level of assurance that the contents of the strongbox will not be
visible to other people and that the items will not be stolen.
The early work by Brandt et al [9] points to the benefits of anonymous and verifiable database, particularly in the context of privacy against government bodies
that wish to cross-correlate data belonging to individuals in society. In [9] the true
identity of each individual remains unknowll and the individual employed a different
pseudonym [10] when dealing with each government body or institution. The main
feature of the work was that each individual must also have the ability to verify that
his or her personal details held by an institlltion are correct. Further work has also
been reported in [11].
However, one underlying difference betweell the anonymous/verifiable database and
the public strongbox concept is the privacy of data. In the anonymous/verifiable
database, it is intended that the institution that maintains the database view the
data belonging to the users, whilst at the same time maintaining the anonymity of
the users. The users can then verify that t.he database contains correct data about
the user (eg. patient record in a hospital system). In contrast, in the public strongbox
concept the contents of the strongbox must remain confidential, with the users still
remaining anonymous and being able to verify the contents of the strongbox.

3

Strongbox Systems: Basic Components

Figure 1 illustrates a simple design for a strollgbox system, borrowing the terminology
from the area of electronic payment systems. All electronic interactions between participants are assumed to be over a secure channel, with peer authentication conducted
at the commencement of communications. The proposed system of Figure 1 does not
pretend to be comprehensive, and it attempts only to address themain components
only. Additional components will be required to support the framework to achieve
full workability.
The participants of the system are as follows:
• Customer: the customer or user, interacting with the Strongbox Provider (eg.

Bank) for the safekeeping of electronic items .
• Strongbox Providel': an institution that provides the electronic strongbox service

to a customer, accepting the storage a.nd retrieval of electronic items to/from
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Figure 1: An Electronic Strongbox System
the electronic strongboxes.
• Value1': the on-line Valuer is trusted to verify that an electronic item belonging
to an owner (ie. Customer) truly exists and has not been modified by its current
owner. The Valuer can also be requested to split items into several sub-items,
and issue certificates for them. Several Valuers may exist on-line, and each must
recognize the other's certification.
• Exchange Facilitator: the Exchange Facilitator aids two or more Customers
who wish to exchange items from their strongboxes. The Facilitator can be a
Strongbox Provider and is under the jurisdiction of the Association.
• Association: the Strongbox Providers and the Valuer work under the umbrella
of the Association. Customers bring disputes to the Association.

In addition, there are the Physical Value1' aud the Notary which are in the physical
world and interfaced to the electronic world. The Physical Valuer should be distinct
from the on-line Valuer as the Physical Valuer knows what a physical item is and
which pseudonym forwarded the physical it.em to be valued. The Physical Valuer
stores the physical items at the Secure Physical Storage, to which the Association has
access in the case of disputes. The Notary comes in on behalf of a Customer when
disputes necessitates their presence 1.
lIn the remainder of this paper, unless otherwise stated, the term "Valuer" will refer to the
on-line Valuer (as opposed to the Physical Valuer).
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The Customer is the owner of the contents of a strongbox and is deemed also as
the owner of the strongbox. The Customer must first join the strongbox system
by opening an account with the Strongbox Provider, which can be a Bank or other
institutions having the necessary computer illfrastructure to provide this service. The
Customer obtains membership through tlw Association which issues the Customer
with the credentials (eg. within a smartcard) and with a pseudonym to be used
within the system. The Customer henceforth employs this pseudonym when using
the system.

4

Design and Security Issues

4.1

Representation of Electronic Items

The representation of items electronically can take two forms, bearing in mind the
needs of the items to be valued or exchanged:
• Item Certificate: this is the electronic item itself in the shape of an unforgeable

certificate and having a one-to-one correspondence with the physical item. The
Item Certificate carries the signature of the Physical Valuer and is co-signed by
an on-line Valuer.
• Description Certificate: this is a certificate guaranteeing that a given item exists

somewhere in the system. The certificate may contain a digest or hash of the
Item Certificate, and is signed by the Oil-line Valuer. The certificate may contain
the pseudonym of the current owner.
The two certificates are inseparable and should be stored in the strongboxes. The aim
of having a Description Certificate is to allow one Customer to prove its ownership to
another Customer before an exchange occurs. During an exchange, both certificates
are handed-over as an item unit.
The concept is derived from the idea of certified photocopies of important documents
(eg. passports) which are often required for government and legal purposes. Periodically the Description Certificate must be renewed by way of the Item Certificate
being reconfirmed by the on-line Valuer.
Similar to electronic cash, some form of serial numbering may be applied to all electronic items system-wide, to prevent illegal copying of certified items by its current
owner. This must be done with the precaution that the serial numbers do not become
way to trace the movement of items [12].
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Upon an exchange between two Customers the Exchange Facilitator may request
an on-line Valuer to re-certify electronic items as belonging to their new owners
respectively. For each electronic item, both the Item Certificate and the Description
Certificate must be signed by the on-line Valuer. The Description Certificate will
then contain the pseudonym of the new OWller of the corresponding item.
Note that no identity information, such as the pseudonym, is mentioned anywhere
within the Item Certificate. Thus, the current owner of the Item Certificate may at
any time obtain the actual physical item by presenting the Item Certificate to the
Physical Valuer. The physical Valuer must then inform the on-line Valuer of the
removal of the item from circulation withill the electronic world.

4.2

Strongboxes

Bearing in mind that electronic items take the form of certificates, a strongbox can
implemented by an organized enciphering the collection of (indexed) certificates be10llging to the Customer. Two general approaches to accessing strongboxes can be
followed depending on the level of trust accorded by the Customer to the Provider:
• Strongbox access by the Customer. H{'re it is the Customer that enciphers and

deciphers the string corresponding to the strongbox. When a Customer presents
his/her identifier during the authentication process, the Provider simply passes
the Customer his/her strongbox via tlte secure channel. The Customer "opens"
(deciphers) the strongbox using the secret key known to the Customer alone,
and either inserts or removes items from the overall collection.
If each individual item in the strongbox is also enciphered, a Customer should
first extract an index of items stored in a particular strongbox. Only then
should the Customer insert/remove specific items .
• Strongbox access by the Provider on behalf of the Customer. If the Customer

trusts the Provider, the Customer call relegate the task of opening/closing the
strongbox to the Provider. Using th(' secure channel the Provider can deliver
the index of items to the Customer, from which the Customer can select items
or insert new items.
Notice here that this is equivalent to the Provider having the access key to a
Customer's strongbox and having the capacity to alter the strongbox contents.
Although this approach has more risks, some methods to limits such risks can
be employed. Thus, for example, the Provider can give a copy of the strongbox
index which is signed by the Provider. The index can be given both at the
opening and closing of a strongbox. lIence, using this index the Customer can
challenge the Provider, should some items go missing from the strongbox.
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In practice a Customer may insert any data string into a strongbox, subject only to
storage space on the part of the Provider. However, such data strings will not have
been certified by any Valuer, and thus would not be usable in any legal (disputable)
exchanges.
There are a number of further requirements that must be fulfilled by any strongbox
system. Some of these are derived from concept in electronic payment systems in
general, while some are specific to electronic strongboxes:
• Privacy of strongbox contents. As in the case of physical strongboxes, the con-

tents of the strongbox should remain undisclosed to all parties except the key
holder opening it using a valid key. Any system implementing the strongbox
should ensure that the institution providing the service does not have backdoor or other hidden channels to access or view the contents of the electronic
strongbox.
In the physical world, some level of trust exists between the bank and strongbox owner, whereby the owner relies on the bank not to place hidden cameras
designed to view the strongbox contents and that the bank will not tamper
with the strongbox. Ideally, such trust should also exist between a customer
and the strongbox provider, similar to the level of trust between merchant and
acquirer [4, 6].
• Privacy of strongbox locations. A user may have multiple strongboxes scattered

all over the Internet under different guarding institutions. The locations of these
strongboxes should be private information, available only to the owner (or any
other delegated user) and the respective institutions.
• Access to st'rongbox only by key holde,.. The institution must without exception

provide access to the strongbox only to the key holder that presents a valid
key. A security mechanism must be pmployecl to provide at least two levels of
verification, namely at the point of reqnest for access to the strongbox, and later
at the point of the opening strongboxes. These two levels can be implemented
cryptographically, and should eliminate possibilities of procedural errors.
• Storage of a variety of electronic items. A strongbox should be able to store

a variety of digital items, subject only to the agreed storage space limitations.
Even such limitations should be easily and immediately negotiable when a user
reaches his or her storage limit, as t.he price for secondary storage continues
to drop. System parameters that protect the strongboxes must be maintained
under secure and tamper-free storage at the institution.
• Items exchangeable between strongboXfs. Analogous to the physical counterpart,

electronic strongboxes must allow for the exchange of items between two (or
8

more) strongboxes. Strongboxes may belong to the same owner, or they may
belong to different owners who are working together.
• Untraceability of moved items. Since the contents of strongboxes must remain

private, moved items must then be untraceable. Untraceability should hold
regardless of how many times an itelll has been moved between strongboxes,
and regardless whether or not the itelll finds its way into a strongbox within
which it previously resided. That is, a strongbox shouldllot have a "memory"
of its previous contents.
• Strongbox key can be delegated. Similar to the physical strongboxes, any person

carrying the appropriate key must be able to open the box. Ideally strongboxes
should even allow stolen keys to be llsed, as the issue of protecting keys is
separate from user anonymity.
In electronic strongboxes, delegation must be provided, whereby an owner of
the strongbox can delegate another user to become a key holder to access the
owner's strongbox. Both users must remain anonymous. At the same time,
delegation schemes must have a limi tcd lifetime or the ability to be revoked by
the owner [13].
Single-use keys may provide a solutioll. in which delegated keys are derived from
the original key, and where the bank holding the strongbox are aware of a key
being a derivative, and would allow only one-off access to a given strongbox.
Multiple-use keys may also be devised, using technology similar to electronic
coins. Every usage of the key would reduce its worthiness, until it is diminished
when it reaches its maximum number of usages.
• Strongboxes movable to othel' institutions. Strongboxes must be movable be-

tween institutions, similar to the way electronic cash or coins are movable
around the Internet. An owner of a strongbox must be able either to move
the entire strongbox without opening it, or to shift the contents of one strongbox at one institution to another stro1lgbox under a different institution. Both
alternatives are attractive, and both should be available to the user, depending
on the user's circumstances. Security, privacy and anonymity must be ensured
in both cases.

4.3

Strongbox Providers

Similar to financial institutions in electronic payment systems, Strongbox Providers
face a range of possible functional and security failures that may affect the reputation of the Provider. However, unlike Internet-based cash or payment systems, the
9
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Figure 2: Check-in and check-out of electronic strongboxes
scenario for fraud by the Customers (or by a Provider) are somewhat reduced. Once
a strongbox is checked-in, the responsibility against any fraud lies at the door of the
Provider. Thus, there are some basic req1lirements which must be satisfied for the
secure working of a strongbox system:

• Proof of the 1'etrieval of a strongbox. The Provider must have some form of proof
that a strongbox is currently being "cllecked-out" (Figure 2). That is, that the
strongbox has been retrieved and is currently in the possession of the Customer.
This is to prevent the Customer from claiming otherwise and therefore forcing
the Provider to take account of loss('s. This notion is similar to that of the
forging of electronic cash or coins, or to that of denying that payments have or
have not been made.
The retrieve and store operations must exhibit the typical transaction properties
of atomicity, consistency, isolation and durability [14, 15].
A further aspect that must be taken iB10 consideration is the allowable length of

time for a strongbox to be held (checked-out) by its owner and the implications
on security. Given that a Customer typically knows the contents of his or
her strongbox - either from human memory or through a list stored securely
(eg. smartcard) - it is reasonable to assume that the check-out and check-in
should occur within the span of a single transaction. The notion of time here is
again similar to that found in electronic payment schemes, in which a merchant
expects some level of immediacy in the payment by a customer.

• Verification of access key to the strongbox. Before providing a key holder with
access to the claimed strongbox, the Provider must have sufficient proof that
the requester (ie. owner or their delf'gate) is a valid party within the system.
That is, the requester has a valid pseudonym and can be authenticated. The
10

Provider must also verify that the key is a recognized and valid key.
One potential problem would be the possibility of the illegal duplication of access
information. That is, the potential t.hat more than one access key exists at
any time. Current technology can soh-e this problem either through smartcard
systems or through the provision of a single-use access keys for the strongboxes.
In the later case, a new access key needs to be generated each time a strongbox
is retrieved and stored.
An interesting notion is that of having backups for strongboxes. In accordance with
previous requirements and the norms found i tl physical strongbox systems, a Provider
does not know the contents of a given strollgbox (nor the value of the items in it).
To safeguard the Provider from any damaging claims by a Customer, two possible
solutions can be employed:
• The two parties can agree upon an upper limit in monetary terms of the possible
claims made against the Provider by a Customer. This is similar to insurance
against losses.
• The Provider can make a backup of a strongbox immediately before a strongbox
is released upon a check-out request hy a Customer. Should a Customer complain or should there be some protocol failure leading to the loss or corruption
of the strongbox, the Provider can bring the backup copy on-line.
Note that additional means should be used to ensure that a Provider does not
make illegal copies of strongboxes and that only a single strongbox is ever valid
on the system.
To prove the authenticity of that single strongbox copy, a hash of the concatenation of the Strongbox and the previous Receipt (previously issued when the
Customer last checked-in his/her strongbox) can be created by the Provider
and delivered to some third party (eg. notary) with an attached lifetime.

4.4

Customers

From the Customer's point of view the Provider is the best point of attack both from
external attacker and from within the Pro,-ider institutions itself. Thus, there are a
number of requirements that need to be satisfied:
• Anonymity of owner'. The owner must remain anonymous, and the fact that
she or he owns a strongbox must also remain a private fact. Methods to create
pseudonyms exist in other forms of electronic commerce which can be used in
the strongbox case.
11

• Anonymity of key holder. The key holder is the user that presents a valid key

to the Provider to access a strongbox held by the Provider. The Provider has
the right to verify that the key fits into one of its strongboxes, and to deny
access if the verification fails. Depending on the system, this must be without
the Customer necessarily revealing the actual key (eg. zero-knowledge- based
solutions). The key holder can be the owner of the strongbox, or any other user
delegated to access the strongbox by its owner.
• Unauthorized retrieval of strongbo:r is impossible. A Customer must have the

assurance that the unauthorized checking-out of his or her strongbox is impossible. Unlike electronic cash, electronic items which are stolen cannot be easily
replaced as the items may have been (~xchanged through a number of hands.
A possible safe-guard can be implemented at the physical end, when Customers
convert their electronic items back in! 0 physical items currently being stored in
the secure physical storage. Even theil, disputes may occur between the current
holder of the electronic item and thos(~ who claim that it was stolen from them.
• Proof of storage by the Provider. A Customer requires some proof in the form
of a receipt that his or her strongbox has been correctly checked-in and that the

Provider now holds the strongbox.
• Proof of valuation. \\Then an item undergoes valuation or when an item is split

by the Valuer into several electronic sub-items, a Customer owning the item (and
thus sub-items) requires proof in the form of the certification of the item (subitems). Clearly the Valuer itself must. be a certified one and be authenticated
by the Customer before any valuatioll transaction occur.
• Proof of exchange transaction. Whell a Customer carries-out an exchange of

items with another Customer via the Exchange Facilitator, both Customers
must have sufficient proof that the exchange occurred correctly in such a way
that neither party can deny the transaction.

4.5

On-Line Valuers

In order to bring an item into the system tll<~ Customer must first obtain a valuation
of the physical item to the Physical Valuer. The Physical Valuer issues the Customer
with a digital certificate corresponding to the physical item. This certificate is recognized and accepted by all participants ill the system. The actual physical item
itself is then stored in the Secure Physical Storage, under the control of either the
physical Valuer or of the Association. Any Customer presenting an electronic certificate for a physical item can obtain the item from the Physical Valuer or through the
Association.

1:2

The unit of the physical item to be valued alld certified must be agreed upon between
the Customer and the Physical Valuer (eg. six bars of gold can be written under
one certificate, or six certificates can be produced corresponding to the six physical
items). Having small units for the valuation allows for easier usage of the items at
a later date. However, should a Customer wish to break-up an electronic item into
several reasonable components - bearing ill mind the physical reality of the item the Customer can approach the on-line Valuer to obtain such services.
Qllce within the system the certificate is referred to as an electronic item. vVhat the
item is and who holds the item presently 1lI1lst remain confidential. A Customer can
store the electronic item with any Strongbox Provider, assuming he or she already
has a strongbox account with them.
For each valued item and valuation result it is important that the Valuer obtains
proof of receipt from the Customer. This is to prevent a Customer accusing the
on-line Valuer of stealing an item submitted [or valuation.

4.6

Exchange Facilitator

vVhen two or more Customers have agreed to exchange items, they can carry-out
the exchange of the corresponding electronic items through the Exchange Facilitator
(Figure 3). Ideally, before an exchange occurs, the Customers should prove the possession of the items to each other. This call be done via the Desc7'iption Certificate
which contains the pseudonym of the owner and which has been signed by a Valuer.
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~E------=---------___
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..
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Figure 3: Exchange of electronic items
However, even without such pre-exchange confirmation of possession, the Exchange
Facilitator must be able to ensure that no cheating occurs. The Facilitator must
inform each Customer as to the electronic items it has received for the exchange
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instance (to prevent cheating), and the Facilitator must also provide a guarantee of
non-repudiation should one (or both) Customer dispute the exchange. The Facilitator
can be a trusted third party, or it can be Olle of the Strongbox Providers selected by
both Customers.
The use of the Exchange Facilitator is optiollal. Customers can perform any exchange
of items directly among themselves, through a secure channel. However, without the
Exchange Facilitator disputes cannot be resolved and the burden of risks lie fully with
the Customers.
Corresponding to the proofs required by a Customer for the exchange of an item,
the Facilitator requires proof of the submission of the items to be exchanged, and
more importantly proof of the delivery and receipt of the items after the exchange.
This proof must come from all involved Customers, and serves as protection for the
Facilitator against false claims by the Customers.

5

Remarks and Conclusion

In this paper we have briefly discussed the issues for the design of a secure electronic
strongbox system for the Internet. The hasic components and requirements of a
strongbox system has been presented, focusing only on the main components of the
system, namely the Customer, Strongbox Provider, the Valuers and the Exchange
Facilitator. This effort does not pretend to he comprehensive, as there are a number
of issues that remain to be resolved in the wider context of electronic commerce, and
also within the specific scope of electronic strongboxes.
Further work will follow in defining precise terms and the protocols for the strongbox
system. In addition, further investigation must be carried-out into the sui tabili ty
of some of the components implementing electronic commerce for use in strongbox
systems. This should lead to a seamless illtegration of strongbox systems into the
larger infrastructure for electronic commerce. This would further allow strongbox
systems to eventually be viewed a simply a service given through and by the Internet.
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